Number of the records: 1
Falzifikácia a paradox inferencie
Title Falzifikácia a paradox inferencie Par.title Falsification and the paradox of inference Author info Miloš Taliga Author Taliga Miloš 1977- (100%) UMBFF10 - Katedra filozofie
Source document Filozofia. Roč. 72, č. 8 (2017), s. 593-602. - Bratislava : Filozofický ústav Slovenskej akadémie vied, 2017 Keywords falzifikácia - falsification objektivizmus(fil.) paradox metodológia - methodology Language Slovak Country Slovak Republic systematics 1 Annotation The paradox of inference is based on the thesis that inferences cannot be both deductively valid and useful because an inference, in order to be useful, must advance us to a new conclusion, but a deductively valid inference cannot, on principle, do that, since its conclusions are contained in its premises. Falsification is a deductively valid inference as well. Its adherents should therefore respond to the paradox of inference. The paper elaborates on the view that critical, deductively valid arguments, e.g. the falsifying mode of inference modus tollens, do not advance those who use them to new knowledge, yet are useful because they help them to eliminate criticized theories. This view is confronted with the traditional response, according to which deductively valid inferences advance us to subjectively new conclusions and thus extend our subjective knowledge. Public work category ADD No. of Archival Copy 41996 Repercussion category GAHER, František. Is Mill really the forerunner of the well-known explanation of counterfactuals? In Filozofia. ISSN 0046-385X, 2019, vol. 74, no. 4, pp. 259-277.
Catal.org. BB301 - Univerzitná knižnica Univerzity Mateja Bela v Banskej Bystrici Database xpca - PUBLIKAČNÁ ČINNOSŤ References PERIODIKÁ-Súborný záznam periodika 
unrecognised
Number of the records: 1