

CONTENTS

	Preface and acknowledgments	x
	Introduction: What is the puzzle of perception?	1
	1 The character question	2
	2 Why the character question is hard: the external-internal puzzle	6
	3 Why the character question is important: the significance of experience	12
	4 The organization of this book	14
1	The sense datum view: Experiencing virtual reality	17
	1.1 Naïve realism: the window shade model	18
	1.2 The sense datum view: the brain as a virtual reality device	21
	1.3 The act-object assumption	27
	1.4 The argument from hallucination for the sense datum view over naïve realism	30
	1.5 The argument from illusionism about sensible properties for the sense datum view over naïve realism	36
	1.6 The sense datum view neatly solves the external-internal puzzle	42
	1.7 The <i>percipi</i> problem about pain	44
	1.8 Can the sense datum view explain our access to the external world?	45
	1.9 Do simplicity considerations undermine the sense datum view?	48
	1.10 Where are sense data?	50
	1.11 Hard cases: perceptual imprecision and incompleteness	52
	Summary	56
	Further Reading	56

2	The internal physical state view: Experiences as inner modifications	59
2.1	What is the internal physical state view?	60
2.2	From experiential internalism to the internal physical state view	65
2.3	Can the internal physical state view accommodate the transparency observation?	68
2.4	The externally directed nature of some experiences	72
2.5	The argument from essential external directedness against the internal physical state view	77
2.6	Could a brain-in-the-void have a favorite shape?	81
2.7	Papineau's reply: rejecting essential external directedness	84
	Summary	90
	Further Reading	91
3	The representational view: Experiencing as representing	93
3.1	What is the representational view?	94
3.2	The argument for the representational view: an inference to the best explanation	102
3.3	Can the representational view explain all sensory-perceptual experiences?	110
3.4	How rich is the content of experience?	116
3.5	The question of skepticism and the dogmatist answer	120
3.6	Does the representational view explain perceptual presence?	126
3.7	Is the representational view intrinsically implausible?	128
3.8	Can the representational view explain the laws of appearance?	130
	Summary	135
	Further Reading	136
4	How does experience represent the world?	139
4.1	Two questions for representationalists	140
4.2	Response-independent representationalism	142
4.3	Armchair arguments against response-independent representationalism?	148
4.4	The problem of internal dependence about sensible properties	151
4.5	Other problems about sensible properties	161
4.6	Response-dependent representationalism	164
4.7	Two problems with response-dependent representationalism	167
4.8	Internalist-nonreductive representationalism: the basic idea	170
4.9	Must internalist representationalists treat color as illusory?	175
4.10	Is internalist representationalism plausible for spatial experience?	178
4.11	Is internalist representationalism mysterious?	182
	Summary	185
	Further Reading	185
5	The return to naïve realism: Experience as openness to the world	188
5.1	A basic form of contemporary naïve realism	190
5.2	How naïve realism differs from representationalism	195
5.3	Naïve realism <i>v</i> representationalism: intrinsic plausibility	198
5.4	Naïve realism <i>v</i> representationalism: explanatory role	202

5.5	Representationalism ν naïve realism: hallucination and illusion	207
5.6	Representationalism ν naïve realism: two arguments from science	215
5.7	Can internalist-selectionist naïve realism answer the arguments from science?	222
5.8	Can ways-based naïve realism answer the arguments from science?	226
	Summary	232
	Further Reading	232
6	Conclusion	235
6.1	Explaining essential external directedness at the cost of denying internal dependence	236
6.2	Explaining internal dependence at the cost of denying essential external directedness	237
6.3	Accepting both essential external directedness and internal dependence	238
	Further Reading	240
	Glossary	241
	References	244
	Index	260